White Ensign Oration 03 March 2023

What a great honour it is to be speaking on the First Gulf War tonight. It is now some 32 years since we fought that conflict. I joined the Navy in 1976 at the old age of 16, and that was some 31 years after the end of the Second World War. So the reality is that the Gulf War is longer ago now than WW II was when I joined.

So a pertinent question is whether the lessons and reflections on the Gulf War, especially the maritime side of it, are still relevant to us today? I think so and hopefully over the next 15 minutes or so I can address this as I think it is a conflict which is quite often overlooked but one which in fact had many lessons which are still prescient for us. I only have 15-20 minutes to cover a big topic and many months so I will focus in on my reflections.

Now they are my reflections and I was the Direction Officer in HMAS BRISBANE under the command of Chris Ritchie, so if this is BRISBANE centric somewhat I apologise in advance.

I will start by briefly reminding you of the events, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 1st August 1990. After condemning the Iraqi invasion and demanding Iraq’s withdrawal the UN Security Council decided to impose economic sanctions against Iraq and occupied Kuwait.

The Security Council also authorized states with maritime forces in the area to “use such measures as may be necessary” to ensure strict implementation of the sanctions as related to shipping and trade, especially potential armaments into Iraq and Iraqi fuel exports on which their economy depended. To assist in this, HMA Ships SUCCESS, ADELAIDE and DARWIN were deployed basically over a weekend.

Now before I go further the list of CTGs and Commanding Officers is a veritable who’s who of major characters and distinguished leaders in our Navy:

Don Chalmers was CTG of the first deployment

Bill Dovers was CO of ADELAIDE

Russ Shalders was CO of DARWIN

Graham Sloper was CO of SUCCESS

Chris Oxenbould was CTG for our deployment

Chris Ritchie as mentioned was CO BRISBANE

Lee Cordner was CO SYDNEY

John Moore was CO WESTRALIA

John Griffith commanded AUSCDT 3.

Not to mention the Executive Officers, heads of departments and key warfare personnel and ships company, many of whom also had long and distinguished service. So this was key for our Navy for years afterwards. It would also be remiss of me not to mention the late, great Ted Walsh. Ted was the chief damage control trainer at Fleet for the ships using his experiences from the Royal Navy and the Falklands War just 8 years earlier. He really made sure we were well prepared should the worse have happened, and we thank him and remember him especially for this.

Now, as a hot war became more likely, BRISBANE in company with HMAS SYDNEY commenced deployment to Operation Damask on 12 November 1990 after an extensive enhancement package (Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBS) fitted, 2 x Phalanx CIWS and magazines fitted in BRISBANE, Radar Absorbent material or RAM panels fitted with great assistance from the then Defence Science and Technology Organisation. (In fact I signed for all the ones fitted to BRISBANE, some 700 or so, luckily I have never been asked to account for them). ElectroOptical infra-red surveillance devices were also fitted in about 6 weeks) and then we did a workup off the coast of Sydney which continued during the passage around the bottom of Australia and past Diego Garcia en route to the Persian Gulf.

The ships entered the area of operations in the Gulf of Oman on 3 December 1990 in company with SUCCESS who had remained from the first deployment of DARWIN and ADELAIDE. In fact there is a famous photo of all five ships in the Gulf of Oman as we handed over.

We then entered the Persian Gulf itself on 16 December, passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Together with the extra weapons, sensors and RAM panels we were very aware of the infra – red missile threat, so we also had fire hoses laid and punctured so that sea water cooled the hull in the vicinity of the fire rooms where our 1250psi boilers were. This worked a treat and completely changed the heat signature of BRISBANE so that any IR missile that got though wouldn’t impact the hull and fire rooms, but the stacks – which we thought was a lesser danger, perhaps a lesser of two weevils! (to paraphrase Russell Crowe in Master and Commander)

We were the first Australian ships to actually enter the Persian Gulf in this operation. We conducted operations from then on as part of Battle Force (BF) Zulu (Persian Gulf Battle Force). The Americans call it the Arabian Gulf so everything was the Northern Arabian Gulf or NAG Battle Force, but tonight I will call it the correct name, the Persian Gulf.

Within the Persian Gulf, well before the war itself, our battle force was tasked to conduct sea superiority, counter-air, maritime interception and offensive strike operations. Supporting naval operations provided protection of sea lines of communications, amphibious operations, maritime support operations – including mining, explosive ordnance destruction and logistics. I will concentrate on Air Warfare as that became our primary focus in the period we were in the Persian Gulf and was my responsibility as the D.

Air Warfare Objectives were many but included:

a. Providing a layered defence to protect the Carrier Task Force operating areas,

b. Maintaining a continuous 24 hour CAP coverage in the Northern Persian Gulf.

c. Providing air warfare protection for amphibious ready groups

d. Providing defence in depth against threats originating in, or transiting through Iran, yes Iran – some things never change.

The potential threat from Iran was treated very seriously and was exacerbated by the mountains which created extensive radar shadow zones on the eastern shore of the Gulf. These could effectively shield Iraqi and Iranian aircraft approaching the force from shipborne radars until feet wet. The Zagros Mountains on the west coast of Iran in particular were a concern and a dedicated air warfare escort was stationed specifically to guard against this threat. Often this was BRISBANE, due to the superiority of our 3D SPS 52C air search radar. Further to this, extensive use was made of airborne early warning aircraft, predominantly carrier borne and land based E2C Hawkeye aircraft. These were tasked to patrol the eastern edge of the Gulf constantly. USAF and Saudi Air Force E3 AWACs also conducted 24 hour operations over Saudi Arabia monitoring the northern and western threat sector.

Joint combined operations with multi-national naval forces required a high degree of air deconfliction and co-ordination. That this was achieved can be ascertained from the fact that throughout the Operation over 14,000 sorties were flown by carrier borne aircraft without a single blue-on-blue engagement. That is a pretty remarkable statistic.

Due to the limitations back then, especially issues of bringing NATO and Pacific based forces together, which in those days operated to different tactical data link standards, the division of responsibility was stipulated geographically. The US Air Force and Marine Corps had responsibility for what was known as the Western Sector. This was basically Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States out to 12nm from shore. The rest of the airspace above the Persian Gulf eastwards was known as the Eastern sector and was the responsibility of the maritime forces.

The Threat

Its sometimes forgotten today that the Iraqi order of battle had the capability of inflicting a large pre-emptive strike against coalition naval forces.

The Iraqi air force comprised 1315 aircraft at the time of the invasion of Kuwait. Of these some 817 were fighters/fighter bombers and 14 dedicated bombers. Many of these were obsolete, however modern technologically capable aircraft included 83 Mirage F1 EQ5/EQ6 variants with Exocet missiles, 41 MIG 29 Fulcrums, 33 MIG 25 Foxbats , 23 SU24 Fencers and Puma helicopters with Exocets as well. This ORBAT, when coupled to the uncertainty of Iranian reaction to Allied actions and the proximity of friendly forces to potentially hostile land masses, formed the basis of the air warfare organisation.

Indeed some of the more nervous moments were in Dec 1990 well before hostilities when together with the US AEGIS Cruiser, BUNKER HILL, we were up as close as 60nm south of Iraq and they were flying F1s down and going feet wet directly towards us on Exocet firing profiles, luckily without launching as that was when the forces at sea were not that strong.

ALLIED Forces

As January unfolded and the UN deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait approached, we really started to beef up the maritime air presence and from then on Allied forces had a technological and numerical advantage over Iraq. Prior to 11 January 1991 the first carrier to arrive, USS MIDWAY (CV 41) had conducted operations predominantly in the Gulf of Oman. In late 1990 she operated twice in the Southern Persian Gulf for periods of about one week. Then other Carriers arrived and moved into the Gulf permanently:

First it was USS MIDWAY CV41 Battle Group on the 11 January, just 6 days before hostilities. Then 5 days later it was the USS RANGER CV61 Battle Group and two CV operations commenced.

On 17 January 1991 the US pre-emptive strike signalled the commencement of Operation DESERT STORM. 400 plus tomahawk missiles were launched from US ships surrounding BRISBANE – quite a sight from our AAC I was told – that is when I learnt what outgoing friendly missile symbology was for and what the code word “Happy Trails” and “Free Riders Away” meant!! I was on watch in the Operations Room and we went to action stations in the very early hours and awaited an Iraqi response – none came that day.

Just three days after this the USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT CVN71 Battlegroup arrived in the Gulf and Three CV operations commenced Finally on 15 February USS AMERICA CV66 Battlegroup was moved from the Red Sea to the Gulf and Four carrier operations commenced leaving the USS SARATOGA CV60 and USS JOHN F KENNEDY CV67 in the Red Sea.

So in effect we had four CVs and their battle groups in the Persian Gulf and in the Red Sea – pretty impressive stuff.

Now multi-national forces operating in support of UN resolutions had varied taskings that were stipulated by national directives. These precluded the employment by the USN of some units for integrated air warfare due to varied national Rules of Engagement, which were key determination in who was where and who could do what, as was English language issues on the circuits. Naval forces included units from France, Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Italy and Argentina.

Naval units from Australia, Britain, US and Canada, (so the four eyes) were predominantly in the northern Persian Gulf. Naval forces from Western Europe predominantly patrolled the southern Persian Gulf and had little input into the air warfare posture. This yet again highlights the need for constant interoperability, combined training, exchange postings and compatible systems between close allies and partners.

The carriers operated within areas that were approximately 60nm long and 20nm wide which was based on an axis of 3200 which was the prevailing wind direction. This area moved progressively upthreat towards Iraq as hostilities progressed.

Operations

Three permanent Combat Air Patrol or CAP stations, where defensive fighters constantly patrolled, were established in December 1990 and this was expanded over time to eleven. These were supported by four tanker stations. These sustained extensive strike patterns which were being flown from the carriers. At the height of the offensive, five tankers were airborne continuously to support major strike periods. The way the Americans did this was just really, really impressive. This has stood with me for the last 32 years. Wow, they know carrier operations and just how effective and versatile carrier based air power is.

One big issue was the identification of civilian aircraft. If there was any doubt a challenge was issued and/or a visual ID conducted by CAP. Warning procedures were initiated and a unit would conduct ‘tornado’ procedures. Again we had no instance where civilian aircraft were engaged, obviously most stayed well clear in any case.

As can be expected in a hectic strike environment there were many occasions where aircraft identification was fraught. It had been repeatedly stressed that failure to abide by correct return to force procedures would see the aircraft classified as a ‘SMOKER’ that is to quote the USN “a pilot who wishes to share his cockpit with an SM-2 block 2 missile”. Many friendly aircraft were locked up by FC systems, many visual identifications and challenges carried out, but the aggressive attitude of all units to ID and deconfliction proved effective and safe. Indeed at one stage BRISBANE had an unidentified helicopter locked up for some minutes coming from the rough direction of Iran before its ID as British was established.

RAN Participation in Air Warfare

As for BRISBANE and SYDNEY specifically, we were employed for the majority of the period as escorts for the carriers and were assigned in grid sectors. Due to the very real threat of drifting mines BRISBANE would cruise up threat which was essentially up current during daylight hours and then basically slowly move or drift down with the current at night. The Electro optical system and a mine lookout would sweep for mines. Having 4 x 1250 psi high pressure boilers focused our mind on this. Replenishments at Sea of fuel and provisions occurred about every 4 days and those sometimes included importantly mail drops, yes it is 32 years ago so we all wrote letters and hungrily awaited them. We also became very used to American Babe Ruth chocolate bars and Hershey bars in general.

Based on commonality of equipment and ease of RAN/USN integration, both RAN units maintained responsibility for the more crucial north/northwesterly screening sectors of the carrier operating area in the weeks leading up to, and throughout, the six weeks of hostilities. Assignment also included the sector known as the ‘Zagros Mountains Gategard’ which saw ships specifically tasked to guard the radar shadow zone down to the Iranian coast. Both ships patrolled to within 15nm of Iran while carrying out this duty which ensured a high degree of alertness, especially given the uncertainty engendered by the migration of so many Iraqi aircraft into Iran in late January and early February.

Other duties were CV shotgun, combat search and rescue duty in the Northern Persian Gulf for SYDNEY and northern Persian Gulf escort of replenishment vessels for BRISBANE.

As I mentioned earlier, the SPS 52C air search radar, the 3D air search radar in BRISBANE with its many modes proved equivalent to the first generation SPY-1B radar in many cases and actually superior in the littoral which was another reason for Zagros Mountain employment.

IRAQI Attacks

Iraq made several attempts to attack the maritime force. There were some significant ships in the Gulf. After 17 January 1991, Iraq made two attacks with Mirage F1 aircraft, but these were shot down by Allied fighters short of Exocet release range. Both attacks employed no deception attempts and only 4-5 aircraft – far too few to break through. One mass raid of 40 plus aircraft etc. could have had very different results. Other threats which we were on alert against was a chemical attack using SCUD missiles. SPS 52C actually tracked a number of SCUD missiles heading into Saudi Arabia. The Silkworm missile was also an issue. About 20 were fired with one shot down by HMS GLOUCESTER. Most missiles appeared to be defective. The Iraqi navy consisted of brown water units, supplemented by captured Kuwaiti patrol boats. In the early days of the war they made only tentative forays and were subjected to air and surface attacks. They played no meaningful part in the conflict and were attacked, harassed and destroyed by allied forces with relative impunity. Some 138 vessels of all types were sunk or rendered non – mission capable.

As also mentioned earlier, mines were a significant threat. Iraq laid extensive minefields around Kuwait with some 2000 mines laid. Many were also loose, being deliberately laid as free floating. These floated down the western side of the Gulf and up the east coast in an anticlockwise direction. Two US ships, TRIPOLI and PRINCETON were seriously damaged in February by mines. BRISBANE had three mines detected within about ½ nm from the ship.

Our ships spent about 55 days at sea non-stop in Defence Watches. WESTRALIA replaced SUCCESS as the Aussie ship in the Allied replenishment group midway through our deployment. For BRISBANE this was 6-hour watches as the Stokers could only spend 4 hours in the fire rooms and then did the next 2 in damage control stations. I am pretty sure that 7s and 5 were used in SYDNEY but this could not work for BRISBANE with our steam boilers and the heat in the fire rooms and engine spaces. This was draining especially given the fact that due to underway replenishment operations the time at sea was virtually unending within a high-risk environment. We gave a situation report at every change of watch from the Operations Room and then we stayed quiet so the off watch had a chance to sleep. Thus, those in damage control stations and machinery spaces had few if any updates for the six hours and I wonder now if that led to increased mental stress as this was unrelenting for eight weeks straight at one stage. We in the Operations Room had the full picture, the vast majority of the ship’s company, many below the waterline did not. Food for thought I reckon and something I have only really considered deeply as the years unfold. We were also injected with vaccinations for a range of things including anthrax and the plague (my GP has never seen anyone who has had plague injected in them except me!) and we also took the nerve Agent pre-treatment tablets or NAPS tablets and had atropine etc with us at all times.

We did attempt to shut down BRISBANE against any chemical attack, but we gave up as it just got so hot so quickly it was just not achievable! The visibility was sometimes awful as was air quality, due to sand and the toxic smoke from the oil fields that the Iraqis were burning.

The maritime impact in the Gulf is all too often forgotten or downplayed these days. A classic and recent example being the RSL NSW’s Facebook post on 28 Feb to mark 32 years since the end of the Gulf War. It was great that they remembered this and commemorated it, but there was no mention of the maritime at all, totally ignored. Even the three photos were of a tank and some land destruction. The fact is that Naval forces facilitated an immediate diplomatic and political response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait by economic blockade, transported the vast majority of land forces and their equipment to the area of operations and then provided significant naval gunfire support and offensive strike via carrier borne aircraft and cruise missile attack against Iraqi military installations and positions.

At the height of the conflict six aircraft carriers, two battleships, 15 cruisers, 67 destroyers and frigates and over 100 logistics, amphibious and smaller craft were involved. These forces were drawn from 15 nations and deployed more than 800 rotary and fixed wing aircraft.

Despite the threat of floating mines, Allied control of the sea was absolute, with the economic blockade being completely successful. In addition to the success of the strategic strike from the sea, the threat of amphibious attack caused consternation to the Iraqi command and resulted in significant Iraqi forces being retained in Kuwait itself, rather than being moved to face the Allied land offensive when it began.

The Gulf War was an excellent example of the contribution that maritime units and maritime power can make. The roles and tasks of maritime surveillance, maritime patrol and response, protection of offshore territories and resources, intelligence collection and evaluation, protection of shipping, strategic strike and operations in support of land forces were all executed by the Allied navies in the Persian Gulf.

To conclude this was a multi-faceted hot war with air, sea and a mining threat. It demonstrated the importance of having meaningful three dimensional air warfare capability, something we gave away almost immediately afterwards as the 90-s progressed and the DDGs weren’t replaced, leading to a 20 year gap. The other is the role of organic sea based air.

If anyone here can tell me how you get air control in the vicinity of Papua New Guinea or the islands to our north, (over the Bismarck Sea is a perfect example, which is over 2000 km from Darwin and Townsville and 1000km from RAAF Scherger) without taking the airpower with you, then please let me know. No diplomatic agreements required, no airfields required, no weather or local thunderstorm issues, communications, defects at distance etc. I could go on. Just about every conflict at sea over the last 100 years has proven the need for sea based fixed wing air, yet we in Australia think as an island nation we can rely on land based air. Good Luck!

I am pretty sure that the strategic review will not address this, we never really seem to. This year also marks 40 years since we lost this capability. Indeed when we get nuclear submarines we will be the only country with this capability that does not also have aircraft carriers and organic fixed wing air power from the sea. And we are an island surrounded by the three largest oceans in the world. It’s not so much strange as sad.

Finally a noted capability which I don’t think we now possess either was the ability to change the coding software and re-write our Naval Combat Data System (NCDS) in house and basically on the fly because we had the expertise within Defence and Navy. Those old and bolds with us with an operations Room DDG/FFG background should remember the Combat Data Systems Centre or CDSC in Fyshwick, Canberra which wrote our NCDS software which was invariably better than its USN equivalent.

They were key to our success in the Gulf War, pivotal actually. As an example over New Year’s Eve in 1990 interoperability was being tested as NATO and Pacific Fleet ships tried to work Link-11 together with differing operational specifications. We actually crashed the British Type 42 destroyer GLOUCESTER on 18 occasions as she kept dropping out of the LINK and then IAW Pacific rules we would take over reporting her position, but then she would pop back in and crash again as we were reporting her. I knew the old UK ADAWS combat system as I spent two years as a PWO in HMS CARDIFF another Type 42 destroyer directly before I joined BRISBANE. As the UK were the bigger player we were going to be cut off, until CDSC did a patch overnight on New Year’s Eve 1990. We can’t do that now as we don’t have the in-house capability. The Brits, as they had outsourced their combat system to the commercial support world back then, couldn’t do it even, but we could.

Chris Ritchie actually sent a signal message to them when we had patched our NCDS that I had composed basically saying that 18 system crashes and the loss of the Ashes, notwithstanding, we wished them a Happy New Year. I was surprised he sent it, but we were not surprised to not get a reply. Humour and banter in war is essential and moments like this do lighten the mood.

After the Gulf War the RAN had a virtually continuous presence in and around the Gulf for 30 years and just about everyone who has served has done multiple deployments there. Our ships company was superb, and it was an honour to serve with them in BRISBANE. Well it is late and I have probably gone on too long, but I hope I have reminded you all of the complexity and nature of what we did some 32 years ago and how important all facets of maritime power projection is, air, surface and undersea warfare.– food for thought as we go forward.