Australia’s maritime air power

by Tom Lewis

This essay was awarded first prize in the Naval Officers Club Literary Prize competition, 2003. It was published in the Naval Officers Club Newsletter Number 54, 1 September 2003, pp 1, 4-7.

LEUT Tom Lewis (right) receives his $500 cheque from Vice President CDRE John DaCosta.

In early 2001, Australia’s defence posture was dictated by the White Paper produced at the beginning of that year. Two of its major imperatives were the defence of the Australian continent, and the need to participate in global security.

Since then we have seen the al-Qaeda attacks of September in that year, a subsequent host of terrorism strikes, not least of which was the Bali bombings, and the threat of rogue nations such as Iraq and North Korea. We participated in the action to neutralise Iraq, but we still live in an uncertain world, and there are few signs it will become more stable.

The second imperative of our posture is becoming stronger and enmeshed in the first: to safeguard our nation we must go further afield. And to do that properly, Australia’s air force needs to take to the seas, and Australia’s navy is the only means of ensuring that.

The British saw the writing on the wall some years ago. Elements of their Royal Air Force, equipped with the GR7 Harrier, are configured as Joint Force Harrier (JFH) which “remains ready to deploy anywhere in the world with the RN’s Sea Harriers as part of a Naval task force”.¹

A sectioned F-35B STOVL version, favoured by the RN. (Lockheed Martin graphic)

Recently the UK’s Ministry of Defence announced the building of the biggest aircraft carriers in the RN’s long history. Two 60,000 tonne carriers will be built by BAE Systems. This means that elements of their air force, joined by the Fleet Air Arm with the new Joint Strike Force fighter, will be able to take all of the capacities of a carrier battle group, including land target attack, anywhere where their government thinks it will be needed.
We must go to the enemy

Why is the capacity to deploy away from one’s own country important? Firstly, it follows the Principle of War of Aggressive Action. Put simply, this means that one should not wait for any enemy to come to you before engaging. That gives the enemy time to prepare, and allows them to choose the battlefield. Good strategic planning means that we want to choose the time and place of an engagement, preferably upsetting the enemy’s preparations at the same time.

Secondly, the asymmetric threat nature of post-September 11 enemies may well mean that we have to go to where the enemy has their centre of gravity and attack them there. So it was with the strike against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. So too with the strike against Iraq. In the turbulent world ahead, there are rogue nations and organisations of militant quasi-Islam which will seek to attack those countries that embrace the political alternatives.

Paul Dibb summed up the strategic situation after the September 11 attacks:We face an arc of instability to our north, a weakened South-East Asia and an uncertain balance of power with the rise of China. Indonesia – the fourth largest country – has an unpredictable future. Prudent Australian defence planners must consider that Indonesia has the attributes of a friend and a potential adversary.²

Australia is part of a region that is steadily unravelling. Trouble lies ahead, and Australia will have to do its best to continue as a sovereign nation that exists through seaborne trade. Bob Moyse points out:…some of Australia’s most vital areas of interest lie … in the Sea-Air-Land gap of the Indonesian archipelago. About 95 per cent of Australia’s trade is carried by sea and most of this goes far to the north before turning east and west onto the world’s shipping lanes. Any significant interference with this trade would have a devastating effect on the Australian economy.³

Possible threats

How far can our imagination take us to envisage a possible threat? A nuclear weapon exploding in a capital city of the West? Germ warfare sweeping through subways, infecting thousands? A rogue state launching an attack with nuclear weapons on a neighbour? In summary our forces may increasingly have to deploy over-seas to help ensure global security.

F-35C deck lands. (Lockheed Martin photo)

Fighting overseas is nothing new. Indeed, the aircraft carrier concept, born largely for the RAN after WWII and brought to fruition in the 1950s, was to ensure Australia could prosecute its interests far from our shores. As the Chief of the Navy from 1962-64, Admiral Burrell, said: “We will need a Navy as long as Australia remains an island – and the best place to fight, if unhappily that should be required, is as far from Australia as possible”.⁴ Admiral John Collins, veteran of WWII, was a strong advocate of naval air power. He was of the opinion that “A fleet that goes to sea without its aircraft today is just as obsolete as a fleet under sail … Carriers give a fleet tremendously increased striking power and widely increased mobility.”⁵

Indeed, as the Minister for Defence announced in 2003:

Australia’s immediate region continues to face major challenges, making it more vulnerable to transnational security threats.The changed global security environment and the increasing likelihood that Australian national interests could be affected by events outside our immediate neighbourhood mean that ADF involvement in coalition operations further afield is somewhat more likely than in the recent past.This is likely to involve the provision of important niche capabilities such as those deployed in the war against terror and those forward deployed to the Middle East for Operation Bastille.If adverse trends in our region continue, there may also be increased calls on the ADF for tasks in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood. Operation Bali Assist is a recent example.⁶

RN carrier concept

Why might it be necessary for considerable air power to accompany any army or maritime forces deployed overseas? The British carrier concept sums it up:

Aircraft have mobility, flexibility and versatility which are the keywords of a modern defence strategy. The CVS and its Carrier Air Group (CAG) can move to almost anywhere in the world in international waters. Aircraft may be the first on the scene in a particular operation giving both politicians and military commanders options, including early reconnaissance, the landing of special forces and land attack from the air. Additionally the CVS provides air traffic control, fuel, maintenance and briefing facilities. Events throughout the 1980s and ’90s have demonstrated the high value of the CVS.⁷

Now, it might be argued that Australia’s needs are not the same as those of Britain. Quite so. But how do we know – in this new, unstable world – what our needs might be? We do not, but we can agree that they might be to deploy overseas in support of like-minded partners, and to deploy overseas to attack threats to Australia. A carrier-based force would give us flexibility, which having aircraft based within Australia does not.

Certainly, the RAAF deployed successfully to runways within the Middle East recently, but we cannot always be sure that there will be runways for us. Even if there are, they may not be as off-limits as were those of the coalition forces in the second Gulf War: far away from the enemy and well-defended just in case. Having an airfield that cannot be easily attacked by guerrilla or special forces gives that flexibility.

The old F-111 (left) and F-18 are two aircraft the RAAF is planning to replace by an upgraded F-18 and the F-35.

If we therefore wish to engage enemies far afield, it may be necessary to use air power, sea power and land assets all at once, or individually. It follows too that we might be best not presuming that our allies will always be there for us.

Australia/USA

Although the United States and Australia have stood shoulder to shoulder in the past and will doubtless do so again, it may be possible that US forces in the future are too stretched to be of assistance. Australia, it is argued, must be prepared to go far afield and support ourselves to carry out our political and, from there, military necessities. Britain understands that concept well, as John Keegan has pointed out: “Britain’s forces cannot, however, count on operating under the umbrella of American air cover in all future circumstances. A crisis may supervene when national air power is needed.”⁸

The British have bought into the same airpower project as has Australia – the F-35 fighter. They call their project the Future Joint Combat Aircraft (FJCA), and describe it as being “a joint RN/RAF offensive aircraft able to deploy from bases at sea and ashore.”⁹ BAE Systems will take the leading position as preferred prime contractor for the CV development, with Thales UK performing a major role as key supplier. The project will develop the design put forward by Thales UK.¹⁰ The CVF will be the principal platform for the RN/RAF “Future Joint Combat Aircraft” (F-35) which will eventually replace RN and RAF Harriers.¹¹

Comprehensive package

So, it seems the F-35 will be a comprehensive package. However, the range of 1300 kilometres does not mean much in a world of asymmetric terrorism and rogue states. If the F-35 is land-based it can strike at targets only within the Indonesian archipelago. Even with the purchase of new refuelling tankers¹⁴ to replace the B707 the RAAF will still have limited range. How could land-based aircraft provide permanent air cover in a hostile island situation in the Pacific, for example?

If there came a need to travel further afield, Australia is limited to having friendly airfields from which the RAAF could deploy. Furthermore, the aircraft would need to be protected from enemy assault while they were there. Carrier-based air, by contrast, can deploy anywhere where there are international waters; stay within range while needed – having “presence” – and by merely being there exert pressure, as we saw with the military build-up outside Iraq in 2002, which pressured its government into admitting UN weapons inspectors. Carriers and their aircraft present a unique package that can be used in a variety of ways to project power.

What may well be the nature of future strategic necessity as far as Australia is concerned is the need to take our forces as far afield as they have ever been. This might include deployment to the Middle East, to Africa perhaps (remember Rwanda and Somalia), even in support of European conflicts where we have an interest in preserving peace, suppressing evildoers or supporting friends. What that means is that the F-35 should be even more mobile than it is now. The best way of doing that is to equip the RAAF with fighters that can land on aircraft carriers. That way they can pursue a range of options: landing on British and American carriers, operating off our own ships, and operating from land.

It is proposed further that the Navy acquire sufficient F-35s to protect their ships, both in an air-to-air role and in carrying out anti-shipping strikes against enemy warships. The submarine threat would be countered by the same methodology that is used at present: a combination of anti-submarine equip-ped ships, helicopters and inter-operability with assets such as the RAAF’s Orions. The Navy fighters’ role would essentially be one of force protection and anti-ship strike while at the same time the RAAF F-35s would share the protection role and be utilised assaulting land targets. Could the same role be done by one force’s airpower? Probably not: the navy’s aircraft would be flown by people who would be essentially trained in sea strategy and tactics and would complement the ship’s weapons systems of anti-ship and anti-air missiles. The concept essentially sees the RAAF present to make use of “airfields at sea”, and carry their part of a war inland as necessary. Both aircraft, of course, could be utilised in air-to-air defence.

CostWhat of the cost of such a strategic rearrangement? The carrier-based version of the F-35 is more expensive, but not prohibitively so. To acquire two carriers would be expensive too. Navy’s oncoming Air Warfare destroyers would still be needed: the defence against aircraft at a distance is not the same as defence against missiles somewhat closer in. But the bottom line of any cost equation is whether the taxpayer wants capable defence. Here it is being argued that the best capable defence would be acquired by the aircraft carrier/F-35 combination. As a compromise, it is probably a given that the best option – three carriers – would inevitably be whittled down politically to two, even though three carriers conceivably mean two will always be available.

The RN solution. (MOD Navy graphic)

The two new aircraft carriers will cost the British taxpayer £2.9 billion.¹⁵ In 2003 dollars, that is around $9.2 billion Australian. Defence funding – or rather the lack of it – is a whole new essay in itself, but the bottom line is that we do not spend enough on defence. As The Australian’s Greg Sheridan recently said: “… we have a defence force that is just too small. We have an expeditionary rhetoric, a defence of Australia force structure doctrine and a pacifist budget”.¹⁶

September 11

Defence analyst Paul Dibb points out, that in the wake of September 11 and the Bali attacks: “… now is hardly the time for the Australian Government to pretend that it can do defence on the cheap. We already risk Australia being seen to talk big and carry a little stick, to reverse Roosevelt’s well-known dictum”.¹⁷ He went on to note that the United Kingdom’s defence spending is 2.8 per cent of GDP on defence compared with our 1.9 per cent of GDP.

There would be further costs too, in terms of manning. Of course the RAN would need expansion to cope. And this paper too has not discussed alternatives to the CV option: the Tomahawk missile, launched from submarines and/or surface vessels, is an option for a future force that has often been discussed, although perhaps not capable of the precision-strike of modern airpower. But what this paper seeks to do is fly the kite of carrier-based expansion; an alternative to land bases for the RAAF, and for an alternative methodology for the ADF as a whole to cope with a strange tomorrow.

Conclusion

In summary, Australia’s best move to cope with an uncertain world lies in grasping the nettle, and spending what it takes to best equip the nation for a precarious future. An expeditionary force, based around two aircraft carriers, equipped to deliver modern air power wherever necessary, is taking out insurance to ensure that we will have the necessary military force to deal with an unknown threat.

Notes:

1. Royal Air Force Cottesmore. 2003. http://www.raf-cott.demon.co.uk/harrier.html. 8 March.
2. Dibb, P. 2001. Tinker with defence policy and risk attack. (Originally published in The Australian.) http://www.onlineopinion. com.au/2001/Nov01/Dibb.htm 30 October.
3. Moyse, B. STOVL JSF Needed for expeditionary warfare. Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter. March/April 2003. (12)
4. Text of speech to a CWA conference. (Original copy in the possession of daughter Fayne Mench, supplied to the author.)
5. Jones, C.  Wings and the Navy. NSW: Kangaroo Press, 1997. (33)
6. Department of Defence 2003. Minister for Defence Media Mail List. 26 February. Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update.
7. Royal Navy. 2003. http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/148.html 13 March.
8. Keegan, J. 2003. The Daily Telegraph. Labour must keep its promise to build two new aircraft carriers. http://www.opinion.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main/jhtml?xml=opinion/2003/05/06/do 7 May.
9. Jane’s Defence Weekly. R. Scott. Renamed aircraft project reflects joint RN/RAF role”. http://www.janes.com/defence/air forces/news/jdw/jdwO10607_1 n.shtmlt.
10. Ministry of Defence. 2003. Industrial alliance will build super-carriers. http://www.mod.uk/dpa/future_carrier.htm. 30 January.
11. Naval Projects. 2003. http://homepage.tinet.ie/~steven/navalprojects.htm 13 March.
12. Lockheed Martin 2003. http://www.lmaeronautics.com/products/combat air/x-35/ 13 March.
13. Stephens, A. 2003. An ‘Enlightened’ Decision? Australia and the Joint Strike Fighter. Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter. Feb. (6-9).
14. Department of Defence Media Release 168/03 New Defence Air-To-Air Refuelling Capability advised that “a fleet of up to five new generation air-to-air refuelling aircraft” would be acquired by the RAAF from 2007. http://www.defence.gov.au/media/DeptTpl.cfm?CurrentId=2904.
15. Isby, D.C. Thales carrier build strategy. Jane’s Defence Weekly. http://www.janes.com/defence/naval forces/news/jni/jni030107_1 n.shtml.
16. Sheridan,Greg. 2003. Lack of grunts our major military flaw. The Australian. http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,6237469%255E25377,00.html April 05.
17. Dibb, P. 2002. Does Asia matter to Australia’s defence policy? Australian National University. Public Lecture, 23 October. tp://www.abc.net.au/public/s709786.htm.

References:

Burrell, H. Text of speech to a CWA conference. (Original copy in the possession of daughter Fayne Mench, supplied to the author.)
Department of Defence. 2003. Media Release 168/03 New Defence Air-To-Air Refuelling Capability.
Department of Defence. 2003. Minister for Defence Media Mail List. 26 February. Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update.
Dibb, P. 2001. Tinker with defence policy and risk attack. (Originally published in The Australian.) http://www.onlineopinion. com.au/2001/Nov01/Dibb.htm. 30 October.
Dibb, P. 2002.The War on Terror and Combat Power: a Word of Warning for Defence Planners. Working Paper No. 369. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. Australian National University. June.
Dibb, P. 2002. Does Asia matter to Australia’s defence policy? Australian National University. Public Lecture, 23 October. tp://www. abc.net.au/public/s709786.htm.
Federation of American Scientists. 2003. http//www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/f-35.htm May.
Isby, D.C. Thales carrier build strategy. Jane’s Defence Weekly. http://www.janes.com/defence/naval forces/news/jni/jni030107_1 n.shtml.
Jane’s Defence Weekly. R. Scott. Renamed aircraft project reflects joint RN/RAF role. http://www. janes.com/defence/airforces/news/jdw/jdwO10607_1_n.shtml.
Jones, C.  Wings and the Navy. NSW: Kangaroo Press,1997.
Keegan, J. 2003 The Daily Telegraph. Labour must keep its promise to build two new aircraft carriers. http://www.opinion. telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2003/05/06/do 7 May.
Lockheed Martin 2003. http://www.lmaeronautics. com/products/combat air/x-35/13 March.
Ministry of Defence (UK) 2003. Industrial alliance will build super-carriers. 30 January. http://www.mod. uk/dpa/future carrier.htm.
Moyse, B. 2003. STOVL JSF needed For expeditionary warfare. Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter. March/April.
Naval Projects 2003. http://homepage. tinet.ie/-steven/navalprojects. htm 13 March.
Royal Navy 2003. http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/148.html13 March.
Royal Air Force Cottesmore. 2003. http://www.raf-cott. demon. co.uk/harrier.html 8 March.
Sheridan,G. 2003. Lack of grunts our major military flaw. The Australian. http://www.the-australian.news. com.au/common/story _page0, 5744,6237469%255E25377, 00.html, 5 April.
Stephens, A. 2003. An ‘Enlightened’ Decision? Australia and the Joint Strike Fighter. Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter. February. (6-9).