Analysis: Chain of Negligence Caused the Loss of the Cruiser Moskva
The shock of the sinking of the Slava-class cruiser Moskva, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, continues. In the absence of a satisfactory evidence-based explanation for the event, there has been much speculation. Although the actual cause of the ship’s sinking is not known with 100 percent certainty, it is clear that the flagship sank as a result of a chain of negligence, half of the crew died, and Russia’s pride was broken.
After coming under deadly fire on the evening of April 13, one of the Russian Navy’s most important ships, the Moskva, was reportedly sunk in the Black Sea on April 14 while being towed to the nearest port, Sevastopol. Before Russian media announced the fire and the evacuation of the ship’s crew, Ukrainian forces claimed they engaged the cruiser with homegrown Neptune anti-ship missiles.
A ship, understood to be Moskva, is seen surrounded by smaller vessels. The image is created using synthetic aperture radar (SAR) which can see through clouds. According to Russian accounts she was on fire and exploded. And sunk later while under tow. Image: H I Sutton
Russian media announced the sinking of the mighty cruiser, after fighting the fire and damage for more than a day. On April 17, the Russian Defence Ministry posted on social media a video of the ceremony for the cruiser Moskva, showing that some 240 people survived, or about half the crew.
There are numerous contradicting sides to this occurrence. For example, what caused the fire and explosion, why the Moskva was unable to detect the incoming missile, how only two anti-ship missiles could sink a 12.000-tonne cruiser, and how the Neptune missiles, which were not operational at the start of the war, were fired.
Russia claimed an explosion of munitions caused the fire, while the Ukrainians say they hit the Moskva with two Neptune anti-ship missiles. Russia hasn’t commented on a missile attack and continues to claim the ship caught fire due to an explosion on board and sank due to stormy weather while it was being towed.
In this case, Russia’s statements and claims appear to be inconsistent. Because, while a massive ship like the Moskva is sailing, it is unprecedented for ammunition inside the ship to burst, engulfing the entire ship in flames with no exterior shelling. Furthermore, there was no bad weather in the Black Sea while Moskva was being towed, as Russia stated. The wave height at the time was about 1 meter, and the wind speed was around 14 knots, indicating mild weather and sea conditions.
The report of the fire aboard the Moskva by Russian state media platforms came just hours after Ukraine’s claims that the ships had been fired upon by anti-ship missiles. The conflicting reports by the Russians and the timing of the incident reinforce the view that Ukraine’s claims are accurate.
Ukraine’s assault with Neptune missiles is another curious matter. Because, according to the December 2021 announcement of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, the delivery of Neptune anti-ship missiles was scheduled for April 2022. However, the war fully broke out in February, so it was unclear whether Ukraine has these missiles in its arsenal. The Black Sea Fleet’s unlimited operations near Ukrainian territorial waters reinforced the view that the delivery had failed due to wartime conditions. This was because many believed that if Ukraine had these missiles on the coast, it would establish an A2/ AD (anti-access/area denial) zone, making Russian forces reluctant to approach the Ukrainian coast to avoid a missile attack.
The fact that the Neptune missiles had not been used for 45 days since the beginning of the war strengthens the opinion that the missile was prepared to gain the initial operational capability in the process and that the initial attack on the Black Sea Fleet flagship was made to take advantage of the surprise effect in the fog of war.
In the absence of clear statements from the official side, some speculations are circulating on social media that the cruiser Moskva was busy tracking the TB2 Bayraktar unmanned aerial vehicle, which has inflicted many casualties on the Russian forces since the beginning of the war, and that the Ukrainian forces caught the ship at this vulnerable moment to strike.
There’s also some other speculation suggesting that “Moskva has/had a single main air defence radar (3P41 Volna) for guiding S300 missiles, which has only a 180 degree field of view. Therefore, 360-degree coverage is provided by the 3-D long-range air search radars MR -800 Voshkod/Top Pair for short-range missiles SA -8.” The claim reveals that the Top Pair radar couldn’t distinguish the Neptunes flying over the sea from the crests of the waves due to the stormy weather.
These claims lack a solid basis, as the ship in question is a cruiser with good air defense capabilities. Although TB2 drones are very useful in naval warfare, cruiser-type ships are designed to track and repel multiple air contacts. As a result, paralyzing a Slava-class cruiser with one or more drones is unrealistic.
On the other hand, it is not reasonable to compare a search radar (MR -800 Voshkod/Top Pair) with a tracking radar (3P41 Volna). Prior to the introduction of fixed face AESA radar technology, warships use search radars to detect air contacts. If the air operator believes the contact is a threat, he/she forwards the contact to the tracking radar to illuminate the target for surface-to-air missiles. Tracking radars are not there to “detect” a target, but to illuminate the contact that has already been detected by the search radar. These two types of radars are pieces of a puzzle that serve the same purpose.
Also, these radars may have some blind sectors due to the structure of the ship, but there are other radars to cover the blind sectors, just like the Slava class cruisers have more than one radar (Top Dome, 2xPop Group, 3xBass Tilt, Kite Screech fire control radar). So this ship can continuously track the air contacts, even if the contact moves into the blind sector of the radar, the operator can forward the contact to another tracker and keep following.
As mentioned above, the sea state was not tough to hide the sea-skimming missile from radar. Even if there was a tough sea, the search radar would detect it, but it might have some difficulties in maintaining the contact due to the sea clutter. When the sea state is high, the missile’s flying altitude gets higher because the missile’s altimeter adjusts the altitude from the wave-top.
Slava-class cruisers are equipped with the 4xRum Tub electronic support system, which can detect Neptune anti-ship missiles’ radar seekers. After detecting the radar seeker, the ship would have about 2 minutes to defend against the missile. In addition, the Moskva was armed with 6x30mm/AK630 close-in weapon systems that have their own radar and are capable of detecting and engaging the incoming missiles themselves. The cruiser Moskva had enough sensors and weapons to deal with anti-ship missiles and was expected to perform better against airborne threats. Of course, this is a paper opinion, since the operational readiness and performance of the sensors and weapons were not publicly known. But it did provide air defense in the area of operation, which means that it protected not only itself but also other units in the Black Sea from air threats.
First of all, military intelligence must provide very accurate information about the missiles in the hands of the enemy. In addition, the weapons and sensors used for ASMD on the ship must be operational, perform well, and be fully maintained. Besides, the training of personnel must be at a very good level. Since the ships have only a few minutes to react after the detection of an incoming missile (and there is no time to think here), the measures must be activated automatically, which can be done only by well-trained personnel.
Russia’s first and most serious mistake in this situation is a lack of intelligence. Considering the size of the missiles, it is not a device that can be easily camouflaged, so it would have to be detected by Russian intelligence. For a month and a half, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet operated irresponsibly within the range of this weapon, believing that Ukraine did not have a weapon that could endanger its ships.
Had these missiles been operational from the beginning of the war, they would have been launched on a ship in the last month and a half. During that time, Ukraine received the missiles and prepared them for launch, and Russian intelligence could not detect them.
As mentioned above, the cruiser Moskva cruiser was expected to perform better against the Neptune missiles. There is no record of the cruiser Moskva defending itself against the Neptune missiles in this incident. There is no record of what happened on the ship at the time, but at the very least the ship should have detected the missile, albeit late, and countered with the CIWS, even if it did not have time to defend itself with an anti-air missile.
In this situation, the first possibility is that the missile cannot be detected and that it cannot be countered even if it is detected. Specifically, this means that either the ship’s ESM system did not provide the required early warning, the weather radar did not detect the threat, or the guns were not ready to fire even though the sensors tracked the threat.
On a warship, crew training is the most critical concern. Continuous training should be offered because people operating in various stations of the ship during ASMD must respond quickly without waiting for commands. What happens during ASMD on NATO ships is known as ZIPPO responses, and it is commonly practiced.
The failure of the Moskva to respond to the missile demonstrates that not only do the personnel lack intelligence, but they are also not mentally and physically prepared for this occurrence. There are no records of the CHAFF or decoys being launched, of electronic jamming, of the ship maneuvering, and of the necessary reactions with weapons after the missile is launched, but the fact that such a capable ship is so helpless against an attack far below its capacity shows that the personnel are not well trained.
Another issue related to Russian sailors’ insufficient training is fire-fighting and damage control. A 12,000-tonne cruiser is not normally expected to be sunk with only two missiles. Even if it is hit, the cruiser will most likely be rendered inoperable. Of course, where the Neptune missiles strike is also a factor. If it hit near the torpedo arsenal or missile launchers, the force of the blast may have been amplified. Such a vast and powerful ship, however, must be prepared for such scenarios. The crew was evacuated barely a few hours after the accident, and the ship sank the next day. In this situation, the ship’s personnel were insufficient to fight the fire and save the ship. Furthermore, at the time of the explosion, the cruiser Moskva was not far from the base in Sevastopol, allowing for outside aid.
These omissions might take several forms. As more information on the Moskva incident becomes available, it will be possible to develop more accurate interpretations and learn lessons. The truth is that the loss of the Russian flagship to a state without a navy will go down in naval history, and Russians will mourn the Moskva cruiser for many years.